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AIRPORT SECURITY: PIRACY WITHIN THE
TERMINAL?
Hijacking! This term has been the topic of innumerable news
stories in the past decade and serves as a constant reminder to air
travellers of a peril they may face when aboard a commercial air-
craft. The serious threat to life and property incident to an act of
aerial piracy, coupled with the rising number of attempts, has
prompted governmental action to develop and implement proce-
dures designed to thwart this criminal interference with air trans-
portation. As a result of efforts by the United States Government
and the airlines, it has been shown that only limited procedures are
available which will effectively deter this criminal activity. How-
ever, as in all areas of law enforcement, vital constitutional stan-
dards must be met. Airport security must survive the current fourth
amendment attacks being waged against it.' The purpose of this
note is twofold: 1) to evaluate the procedural steps presently used
in airport security in light of the flexible fourth amendment stan-
dards;2 and 2) to recommend practices that must be incorporated
into the security system if it is to remain viable under our Constitu-
tion.
The scope of the problem of aircraft hijacking is clearly indi-
cated by a cursory review of available statistics. Of the 393 attempts
that have occurred worldwide throughout history, 246 have been
successful.' The need for remedial measures in the United States is
emphasized by the fact that 160 of these attempts have originated
here, 98 being successful.' The significance of these figures is height-
ened in light of the increased passenger capacity of our modern
commercial aircraft. The untold thousands of "victims" who have
been thrust into perilous situations created by the presence of hi-
1. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
2. See notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text.
:3. Interview with Neil Callahan, FAA Director of Public Affairs for the Great Lakes
Region, in Des Plaines, Illinois, Feb. 20, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Callahan Interview].
These statistics were accumulated as of February 1, 1973. The distinction between successful
and unsuccessful is determined by whether or not the hijacker actually gained control of the
aircraft at any time. Id.
4. Id. For a more detailed account of specific instances see Abramovsky, The Constitu-
tionality of the Anti-Hijacking Security System, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 123, 123-26 (1972);
Sonnemann, Aerial Piracy, 1971 ABA SEcr. OF INS., N. & C. L. 135, 136-38 (1971); Toothman,
Legal Problems of Skyjacking, 1969 ABA SECT. OF INS., N. & C. L. 251, 252-53 (1969); Wurfel,
Aircraft Piracy-Crime or Fun?, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 820, 821-28 (1969).
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jackers reflect the immediacy of the problem. It is with this realiza-
tion that responsible governmental and airline officials have re-
solved to frustrate potential hijackers.
THE EVOLUTION OF AIRPORT SECURITY
At the foundation of remedial measures designed to alleviate
the problem of hijacking is the theory that potential hijackers must
be discouraged from attempting this criminal activity. The desper-
ate and determined nature of a hijacker makes his presence aboard
commercial flights extremely hazardous. If passengers are to be ade-
quately protected, it is essential that sky pirates be denied access
to aircraft.
The International Effort - A Prelude to Airport Security
The area in which the United States initially concentrated its
efforts in the struggle to combat aerial hijacking was that of interna-
tional arbitration. It has been the belief of our Government that the
elimination of all escape routes through extradition agreements
would provide an effective supplement to national counteractive
measures. To this end, several international conventions and confer-
ences have been held to bring about this desired arrangement. In
the past however, these efforts have failed to attain their desired
impact due to the lack of ratification by key countries such as Cuba
and Algeria.' This has, in turn, resulted in a compelling national
interest in augmenting security procedures on the home front.
A significant exception to the pattern of failure on the interna-
tional scene occurred on February 15, 1973, when the United States
and Cuba signed an agreement calling for severe punishment of air
hijackers.7 The eleven previous years of severed diplomatic relations
5. Most notable of these were the Tokyo Convention in 1963, the Hague Convention in
1970 and the Montreal Conference of 1971. An analysis of these and other international efforts
may be found in Malmborg, International Efforts to Deter Aerial Hijacking, 1971 ABA SEcT.
OF INS.. N. & C. L. 129 (1971).
6. The importance of Cuba's participation is reflected by the fact that 85 of the 98
successful hijackings in the United States have ended in Havana, Cuba. Callahan Interview.
7. Hijacking Agreement with Cuba, Feb. 15, 1973, [1973] -U.S.T. __, T.I.A.S.
No. 7579. A second similar agreement was reached between Canada and Cuba. Both agree-
ments were to be effective immediately. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 16, 1973, §1, at 14, col. 1.
Despite the probable deterrent effect of the agreement, Secretary of State William P. Rogers
stated that he anticipated no changes in security checks of passengers boarding airplanes.
Id. at col. 2.
[Vol. 8
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between the two countries' had resulted in recognition of Cuba as
the ideal destination for hijacked United States aircraft; the ab-
sence of an extradition arrangement and geographical proximity
were enticing factors.' Fortunately, this recent pact was a giant step
toward elimination of the island as a sanctuary for sky pirates. By
the terms of the agreement, "hijackers may be tried by the country
to which they fled or were extradited for prosecution."'' 0 The agree-
ment also provides that "money obtained by extortion will be re-
turned and both countries are under obligation to speed the contin-
uation of trips of innocent passengers and crewmen."" These signifi-
cant terms appear to be representative of a mutual desire for cooper-
ation between the signers to stop the flow of criminally comman-
deered aircraft to Havana. However, the sincerity of this desire
remains to be demonstrated. If the pact is to be successful, it will
not depend on the provisions of the agreement itself, but rather on
the determination of each party to make it work.
The National Experience
Within our own boundaries, the federal government has initi-
ated rules and regulations through the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration that are designed to promote security within terminals and
aboard aircraft. The Administrator of the FAA has been given au-
thority to prescribe rules and regulations as he "may find necessary
to provide adequately for national security and safety in air com-
merce,' 2 and it was in performance of these duties that regulations
banning the carrying aboard commercial aircraft of deadly or dan-
gerous weapons, both concealed and unconcealed,' 3 and requiring
8. 119 CONG. REC. 2442 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1973).
9. For statistics which verify this see note 6 supra.
10. Hijacking Agreement with Cuba, Feb. 15, 1973, [19731 - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S.
No. 7579 at 2. There is also a provision that hijackers be "punishable by the most severe
penalty according to the circumstances and the seriousness of the acts." Id. at 1.
t1. Id. at 2. However, the treaty also states:
The party in whose territory the perpetrators .. . first arrive may take into
consideration any extenuating or mitigating circumstances. . . in which the persons
responsible . . . were being sought for strictly political reasons and were in real and
imminent danger of death, without a viable alternative for leaving the country,
provided there was no financial extortion or physical injury to... persons in connec-
tion with the hijacking.
Id. This could serve as an escape clause that would dilute the effectiveness of the pact.
12. 49 U.S.C. §1421 (a) (6) (1958).
13. No person may, while aboard an airplane being operated by a certificate
holder, carry on or about his person a deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed
1973]
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the locking of flight crew compartment doors 4 were issued as early
security measures in 1964. Punitive provisions were also enacted
which made it illegal to deliver or transport explosives or other
dangerous articles on commercial aircraft" and prohibited aircraft
piracy itself." Initially these penalties operated as a temporary de-
terrent that minimized the number of hijacking attempts on United
States aircraft.' 7 The year 1968, however, marked the advent of the
current crisis in air piracy. The number of attempts mushroomed
to 22 in that year and increased to 40 in 1969, with 27 attempts
or unconcealed. This paragraph does not apply to-
(a) Officials or employees of a municipality or a State, or of the United States,
who are authorized to carry arms; and
(b) Crewmembers and other persons authorized by the certificate holder to carry
arms.
14 C.F.R. §121.585 (1964); 14 C.F.R. §135.64 (1964). 49 U.S.C. §1472 (1) (1961) imposes a
fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both, for violation
thereof.
14. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the pilot in com-
mand of a large airplane carrying passengers shall ensure that the door separating
the flight crew compartment from the passenger compartment is closed and locked
during flight.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section do not apply-
(1) During takeoff and landing if the crew compartment door is the means of
access to a required passenger emergency exit or a floor level exit; or
(2) At any time that it is necessary to provide access to the flight crew or
passenger compartment, to a crewmember in the performance of his duties or for a
person authorized admission to the flight crew compartment ....
14 C.F.R. §121.587 (1964). In accord with this, 49 U.S.C. §1472 (j) (1961) provides for a
$10,000 maximum fine or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, for interference
with flight crew members or flight attendants (including stewardesses). By the same provi-
sion, if a deadly or dangerous weapon is used, a life sentence may be imposed.
15. 49 U.S.C. §1472 (h) (1958) provides for a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprison-
ment of not more than one year, or both for each offense. Should a person be injured or killed
as a result of such a violation, the offender would be subject to a maximum $10,000 fine or
ten years imprisonment, or both.
16. 49 U.S.C. §1472 (i) (1961) provides:
(1) Whoever commits or attempts to commit aircraft piracy, as herein defined,
shall be punished-
A) by death if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or, in the case
of a plea of guilty, or a plea of not guilty where the defendant has waived a
trial by jury, if the court in its discretion shall so order; or
B) by imprisonment for not less than twenty years, if the death penalty
is not imposed.
(2) As used in this situation, the term "aircraft piracy" means any seizure or
exercise of control, by force or violence and with wrongful intent, of an aircraft within
the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States.
17. After five hijacking attempts involving United States-registered aircraft in 1961, the
numbers decreased to one in 1962, zero in 1963, one in 1964, four in 1965 and one in 1967.
DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, 5TH ANNUAL REPORT, Fiscal Year 1971, at 163.
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occurring in 1970.'1 This prompted an announcement by President
Nixon on September 11, 1970, that armed United States Govern-
ment guards, to be known as Sky Marshals, would be placed on
flights of United States commercial airlines and that use of elec-
tronic surveillance equipment and techniques would be extended by
American-flag carriers to all gateway airports.'9
The inadequacies of the Sky Marshal program became immedi-
ately apparent. The year 1971 saw 14 reported hijacking attempts,
of which only six were frustrated. 0 Despite this virtual 50 percent
reduction in attempts from 1970, the figure'was still excessive. The
inherent weakness of the program was its failure to deal with a
hijacker until the plane was loaded, airborne and its diversion
commenced. At this point, the availability of hostages and immi-
nent danger to all passengers, if apprehension were attempted,
made compliance with the hijacker's demands compelling. As a
result, airports and airlines realized that the only effective method
of deterring hijackers would be to prevent their initial boarding of
aircraft,' and ground security systems were accordingly intensi-
fied.2"
The Profile and Magnetometer
Ground security procedures evolved around the development of
the Behavioral Profile analysis and the electronic magnetometer. It
is therefore appropriate to explain the basic principles of these de-
vices."' The Profile was originated in 1968 by a task force study of
characteristics possessed by actual hijackers.24 The result was an
abbreviated list of 25 to 30 common traits2 5 set forth in capsule form
18. Id.
19. Id. at 23.
20. Id. at 163.
21. 49 U.S.C. §1511 (1970) provides:
JAIny air carrier is authorized to refuse transportation to a passenger or to refuse
to transport property when, in the opinion of the air carrier, such transportation
would or might be inimical to safety of flight.
22. New Orleans' Moisant International Airport became the first airport to conduct
electronic surveillance of all passengers going through its gates. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION,
supra note 17, at 24.
23. For a more complete description see United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077,
1083-84, 1086-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
24. Id. at 1082.
25. Id. at 1086. These characteristics were easily observable and not discriminatory
against any nationality, race, religion, or political ideology. Id.
19731
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so as to enable ticket agents to perform an immediate appraisal of
each passenger and make a determination as to whether he was to
be designated as a "selectee" - that is, a possible hijacker. If a
passenger conformed with the Profile, this information was relayed
to the personnel manning the magnetometer. The customary proce-
dure was then to have this selectee pass through the magnetometer,
along with other passengers selected at random to protect the se-
crecy of the Profile.
The magnetometer is an electronic surveillance device designed
to record the amount of ferrous metal carried by a person who passes
through it. The weapons detector, the term most commonly used to
describe the magnetometer, is adjusted to register a positive reading
when "metal having the effect of a 25 caliber pistol passes through
it. ''26
Under security procedures utilized by airports in recent years,
the Profile analysis and magnetometer search of a person and his
carry-on baggage have been the methods employed to single out
passengers for questioning and a possible frisk by United States
Marshals stationed in the terminal. 27 However, in order to counter
an alarming increase in hijacking and to meet an emergency in air
commerce safety requiring immediate action, 2 an amendment to
FAA regulations was adopted on March 7, 1972.29 The amendment
prescribed the mandatory establishment by each airline of a screen-
ing system acceptable to the Administrator of the FAA.30
26. Id.
27. For a description of the actual steps involved see McGinley and Downs, Airport
Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 293, 303-04 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as McGinley & Downs].
28. 37 FED. REG. 2501 (1972).
29. 37 FrD. REG. 4905 (1972) (amendment 121.85 to 14 C.F.R. §121.538). On March 11,
1972 the amendment was revised to establish the effective date as March 9, 1972. 37 FED.
RF(;. 5254 (1972).
:10. 14 C.F.R. §121.538 (1972) provides in part:
(b) Each certificate holder shall . . . adopt and put into use a screening system,
acceptable to the Administrator, that is designed to prevent or deter the carriage
aboard its aircraft of any explosive or incendiary device or weapon in carryon baggage
or on or about the persons of passengers . . . . Each certificate holder shall immedi-
ately adopt and put into use its security program . ...
(c) Each certificate holder shall prepare in writing and submit for approval by
the Administrator its security program including the screening system prescribed by
paragraph (b) . . . and showing the procedures, facilities, or a combination thereof,
that it uses or intends to use to support that program and that are designed to-
(1) Prevent or deter unauthorized access to its aircraft;
[Vol. 8Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1973], Art. 4
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Airport Security Today
Today, airport security procedures have been intensified so that
all who pass a designated security point within the terminal, pas-
sengers and non-passengers alike, are subject to search." All carry-
on luggage is hand searched or X-rayed for weapons and explosives
and each individual must pass through a magnetometer. :2 Recent
(2) Assure that baggage is checked in by a responsible agent or repre-
sentative of the certificate holder; and
(3) Prevent cargo and checked baggage from being loaded aboard its
aircraft unless handled in accordance with the certificate holder's security
procedures.
In addition, the regulation provides:
(g) The Administrator may amend any screening system or any security program
. . . upon his own initiative if he determines that safety in air transportation and
the public interest require ....
(1) . . . . If the Administrator finds that there is an emergency requiring imme-
diate action with respect to safety in air transportation or in air commerce, . . . he
may issue an amendment, effective without stay, on the date the certificate holder
receives notice of it.
14 C.F.R. §121.538 (g) (1) (1972).
31. Callahan Interview. For a complete history of the events which ultimately led to
intensified airport security searches see Note, Searching for Hijackers: Constitutionality,
Costs, and Alternatives, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 384-92 (1973). Points where the screening
takes place will vary with the plan adopted by the airport. The concourse plan places the
site of the security check point at the beginning of the concourse, whereas the gate plan is
conducted immediately prior to one's entry of the boarding ramp. Interview with Lloyd
Nelson, TWA Security Manager for the Central Region, in Arlington Heights, Illinois, Feb.
20, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Nelson Interview].
32. Callahan Interview. This increase in intensity of security measures was the result
of a directive, issued December 5, 1972, by the Administrator of the FAA pursuant to his
amending powers granted him by 14 C.F.R. §121.538 (g) (1) (1972). Nelson Interview. For
the important terms of this provision see note 30 supra. In cooperation with the requirement
that airlines intensify their security programs, an individual airline's security arrangement
provides:
1) Every passenger . . . must be screened by a weapon detector, prior to boarding.
Passengers must receive weapon detector screening without their carry-on articles.
2) All carry-on articles of passengers will be inspected by a United employee or
authorized agent prior to boarding. Inspection of a carry-on item by a weapon detec-
tor is not adequate or acceptable. The inspection must be an actual physical inspec-
tion. After carry-on articles have been inspected, they will not be released to the
passenger until he or she has cleared through the weapon detector.
United Air Lines Revision to Aircraft Security Program, §IV, §§A, cls. 1 & 2, Jan. 4, 1973.
A visit to O'Hare International Airport in Chicago on February 10, 1973 revealed that
passengers with carry-on baggage were first subjected to a hand search of these articles and
were then obliged to pass through the magnetometer. This practice has continued but the
hand search is gradually being replaced by the systematic X-raying of all carry-on luggage.
The luggage passes under the X-ray unit, at which time a "picture" is projected on a screen
that is viewed by security personnel. These people have approximately five seconds to deter-
mine if the article is then to be hand searched for identification of questionable objects.
et al.: Airport Security: Piracy Within the Terminal?
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additions to FAA regulations have been adopted to strengthen the
deterrent effect of airport security. Most important of these is § 107.4
which requires the continual presence of at least one law enforce-
ment officer at each flight departure point.33 The cost of this venture
is now imposed on the airport operators. This conveniently permits
the federal government to cut costs previously incurred by providing
United States Marshals (not to be confused with Sky Marshals) at
flight departure points. Although Marshals are still to be stationed
within the terminals, the presence of police officers gives rise to an
opportunity for the federal government to reduce the number of
Marshals it must supply. Resultant opposition to this alleged fed-
eral withdrawal has been heated but unsuccessful. 34
Costs of the present security system are already placed predom-
inantly upon the airlines and airports; 35 imposition of additional
costs seems uncalled for. It is submitted that the burden of main-
taining airport security should be shouldered by the federal govern-
ment to insure the uniformity and adequacy of a program which so
intimately affects traditional constitutional rights. When concerned
with a security system that has resulted in approximately 6,000
arrests over a span of 22 months, 80 percent of which were unrelated
Telephone Interview with Lloyd Nelson, TWA Security Manager for the Central Region,
Sept. 19, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Nelson Telephone Interview]. The X-ray equipment was
approved by the Administrator of the FAA and is being employed in various degrees by the
airlines. Id. At O'Hare, United Airlines has totally phased out the initial hand search in favor
of X-ray equipment, while TWA uses both procedures and Braniff uses only the physical
search. Id.
33. 37 FED. REG. 25935 (1972). 14 C.F.R. §121.310 (1972) deals with rear exit security
and requires the construction of each ventral and tail cone exit so that they may not be opened
during flight. 37 FD.. REc.. 25354 (1972). This prevents the parachuting of hijackers to safety.
34. The Airport Operators Council International obtained a temporary restraining order
delaying the implementation of 14 C.F.R. §107.4. However, their application for a permanent
injunction was denied and the program was commenced as of 12:01 a.m., Feb. 16, 1973. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 1973, §1, at 6, col. 1; Airport Operators Council Int'l v. Shafer, 354 F. Supp.
79 (D.D.C. 1973). The airlines are afraid that, since the airport operators must provide the
armed officers, increased costs will ultimately be imposed upon them by such measures as
increased landing fees. Nelson Interview.
35. Nelson Interview. One existing method designed by some airports and airlines to
alleviate a part of the financial strain is to charge boarding fees. Id.
The United States Senate has responded to this problem by unanimously passing a bill
establishing a federal security force. This would require the federal government to pay for all
anti-hijacking personnel and devices. 119 CONG. REC. 3089 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1973). Another
feasible solution to the problem, proposed by Rep. Podell of N.Y., is to use trained armed
service personnel already in the employ of the federal government. 119 CONG. REC. 881 (daily
ed. Feb. 8, 1973). This would substantially reduce costs to the airlines and the Government.
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to acts connected with hijacking, 6 one must take a hard look at the
extreme tolerance that allows such a significant matter of law en-
forcement to be executed by persons possessing differing, and often
minimal degrees of expertise." Although there has been only one
reported hijacking in the United States since the newly formulated
security procedures went into effect,"6 an examination of the consti-
tutional permissibility of the system as a whole must penetrate
beyond its effectiveness and consider the delicate issue of "search
and seizure" as it pertains to airport security.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF AIRPORT SECURITY
"Must I submit to a search as a prerequisite for boarding a
flight?" Such a question must have entered every airline passenger's
mind as he watched the person across the table ardently rummaging
through his suitcase. "Wouldn't I rather go through this temporary
inconvenience, as opposed to facing a desperate hijacker who threat-
ens my safety?" This secondary thought must be answered on an
individual basis by each prospective airline passenger; but the pri-
mary question will inevitably have to be considered by the Supreme
Court. Unfortunately, the issues involved are not as simple as these
inquiries might have them appear. The complexity of the situation
arises out of a conflict between the rights guaranteed by the fourth
amendment and the national interest in promoting safety of people
engaged in air travel. 9 Criticism of airport security searches has
36. 119 CONG. REC. 2469 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1973). Over 2,000 of the arrests were for
possession of drugs, about 2,000 for illegal entry with the remainder including various offenses
from parole violations to forgery. Id.
37. In compliance with the requirement that they provide security personnel, airlines
obtain the necessary manpower through agencies such as Pinkerton's and put them through
a training program. Nelson Interview. This practice is dangerous to the system's validity since
lalny system and the dangers it poses must be evaluated in the light of the skills
and the dedication of those who will operate it . ...
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1102 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Any deviation from the
system's procedures will surely defeat its constitutionality.
The approved system survives constitutional scrutiny only by its careful adherence
to absolute objectivity and neutrality. When elements of discretion and prejudice are
interjected it becomes constitutionally impermissible.
Id. at 1101.
38. Address by James E. Landry, General Counsel for Air Transport Association of
America, Syracuse University Symposium on Aircraft Hijacking, March 27, 1973. This one
attempted hijacking was unsuccessful. Id.
39. Criticism of airport security based upon its alleged restrictions on a passenger's
constitutional right to travel between the states is hardly substantial. The Supreme Court
has stated:
19731
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emphasized the absoluteness of the fourth amendment and has
failed to treat it as the flexible standard it is;4 the fourth amend-
ment is not absolute.' When speaking in terms of what is reasonable
and what is not, there can be no arbitrary delineation. The test for
reasonableness must focus on "balancing the need to search against
the invasion [of constitutional rights] which the search entails."42
It therefore becomes necessary to evaluate each step of the security
system,': keeping in mind that "the specific content and incidents
of" a right under the fourth amendment "must be shaped by the
context in which it is asserted."44
The Magnetometer
The use of the magnetometer to screen all persons passing
through security points in the terminal has been held to be a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.45 A passenger passing
through the device, who does not activate it, is generally allowed to
continue on. However, this is conditioned upon the absence of any
extenuating circumstances sufficient to arouse the level of suspicion
necessary for a search, independent of security procedures. Should
he register a positive reading, the normal procedure is to have the
attendant ask if he is carrying anything metallic on his person which
may have caused the electronic reaction. If feasible, he is asked to
I I n moving from state to state ... appellees were exercising a constitutional right,
and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown
to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (original emphasis). Airport security is a
measure that tries to assure the right to travel for the public and the compelling national
interest in deterring hijackers makes the "resulting inconvenience of the few . . . at least
tolerable." United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 674 (2d Cir. 1972).
40. "1Wj hat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (emphasis added).
41. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Walker v. United States, 404 F.2d 900 (5th
Cir. 1968).
42. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
43. The Profile will not be dealt with since it is no longer in use. Nelson Interview.
44. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); accord, People v. Botos, 27 Cal. App. 3d 774,
-, 104 Cal. Rptr. 193, 195 (1972).
45. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
947 (1972).
46. Searches conducted within the airport terminal by United States Marshals have
been upheld based upon a passenger's unusual nervousness, bulges in his clothing and failure
to produce satisfactory identification on demand. The validity of such a search was unaf-
fected by the absence of a positive magnetometer reading, See e.g., United States v. Moreno,
475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972).
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remove the article, or articles, and proceed through the machine
again. If there is no reaction the second time, he is allowed to go on.
Should an explanation for the initial positive reading identify the
source as an unremovable object, for example metal braces in shoes,
metal pins in bones or brassieres and corsets on women, a "hand
wand" is utilized to verify its presence. 7
This relatively simple practice cannot reasonably be described
as "an annoying, frightening, and humiliating experience" censured
by our courts." When this instrumentality is used in connection
with aircraft hijacking,
[t]he danger is so well known, the governmental interest
so overwhelming, and the invasion of privacy so minimal,
that the warrant requirement for search and seizure is ex-
cused by exigent national circumstances. 9
A search within the terminal by a magnetometer is "more than
reasonable ' 51' and its intrusions on privacy are little more than
minor inconveniences. It is not surprising that our judicial system
has had little difficulty in upholding its validity under fourth
amendment standards.5 '
The "Stop and Frisk" Approach
A much more difficult constitutional problem arises when the
passenger passes through the magnetometer the second time and
still registers a positive reaction. In such an instance, the normal
47. The chronology and details of these procedural steps are from the Nelson Interview.
The "hand wand" is merely a miniaturized magnetometer.
48. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
49. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
947 (1972). Cf. Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
950 (1961) (border searches).
50. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
947 (1972).
51. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
IWlithin the context of a potential hijacking the necessarily limited "search" ac-
complished by use of the magnetometer per se is justified by a reasonable governmen-
tal interest in protecting national air commerce.
United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3rd Cir. 1972) (original emphasis).
The same reasons given to justify the use of the magnetometer may be applied to justify
use of X-ray equipment now employed to screen carry-on luggage. Objections to the X-ray
equipment based upon claims that its radiation emissions are dangerous to those around it
and that it fogs undeveloped film within a suitcase are unfounded. TWA has conducted tests
on both of these matters and has determined that the low intensity radiation used is harmless.
Nelson Telephone Interview.
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procedure is to summon a United States Marshal to question the
subject. If the officer is not satisfied with the answers given, the
passenger is taken to a private area and subjected to a frisk of his
person. The stop and frisk rationale of Terry v. Ohio52 has been used
on numerous occasions to justify the limited pat-down of the person
in the airline terminal.53 In Terry, the Court held that a police officer
who
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude . . . that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, .. . is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons. .... 51
The position of airport security personnel is highly analogous to that
of the police officer in the street. Both are charged with the duty of
safeguarding the lives of those immediately surrounding them. To
perform this function, each must be equipped with constitutional
tools that will enable him to frustrate reasonably suspected criminal
activity. To insure their acceptance, tools of this type must entail a
minimal intrusion upon personal privacy.
To justify a particular intrusion, the Court in Terry further
stated that "the police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant [an] intrustion. ' '5  Despite the sta-
tistical determination that approximately 50 percent of all passen-
gers who pass through the magnetometer activate it," use. of the
device provides these essential facts. When activated, an opportun-
ity is furnished for an explanation; failure to explain, either inad-
vertently or purposefully, should suggest that something metallic
and dangerous may be hidden. The chance that it may be a weapon
52. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
53. See e.g., United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 947 (1972); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3rd Cir. 1972); United States v.
Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972); United States v.
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). For further discussion of the Terry doctrine see
McGinley & Downs at 307-08.
54. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 21.
56. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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does not have to be more probable than not; Justice Harlan, concur-
ring in Terry, made it clear that
[c]oncealed weapons create an immediate and severe dan-
ger to the public, and though that danger might not war-
rant routine general weapons checks, it could well warrant
action on less than a probability. 7
The dangers involved when one possesses a weapon during the
course of criminal conduct within the confines of an airliner, often
miles above the earth, are beyond description. It seems clear that
[i]n the context of a possible airplane hijacking with the
enormous consequences which may flow therefrom, and in
view of the limited time . . .to act, the level of suspicion
required for a Terry investigative stop and protective search
should be lowered. 58
At this time it is critical to emphasize the limited grounds on
which our courts may acquiesce in a frisk and yet respect estab-
lished constitutional restrictions. 9 First, the search must not be
based on conjecture or a hunch60-there must be reasonable grounds
to justify reasonable suspicion.9 ' Second, the "[o]fficials for a Terry
search, must suspect the person of having weapons.""2 There is
never an all-inclusive license to frisk persons based solely on an
official's observation of bulges equivalent in size to a weapon or
upon a belief that a person may be carrying contraband .3 Any over-
57. 392 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1968).
58. United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701, 703 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
995 (1972).
59. Even in a hijacking situation, any intrusion by a [United States] Marshal
beyond the legitimate scope of a weapons search is clearly unjustified and the fruits
of' such an excessive search would be inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceed-
ing.
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1098 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
60. People v. Erdman, 69 Misc.2d 103, 108, 329 N.Y.S.2d 654, 659 (1972).
61. Id. at 660.
62. United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701, 704 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
995 (1972) (emphasis added).
63. Contraband, other than weapons or explosives, discovered during the course of a
valid search may be properly seized. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Simpson v.
United States, 453 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir. 1972). This principle was cautiously applied to the
airline terminal setting in United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971):
If a search is conducted in good faith to locate a weapon [or explosives] and if
it does not go beyond the limits of what is required to uncover such an object [or
objectsI then the officer need not close his eyes to evidence of other crimes which he
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stepping of this carefully prescribed authority will surely be judi-
cially censured and result in a successful motion to suppress.
An interesting problem concerned with who may progress be-
yond the initial screening of passengers and carry-on luggage should
be recognized. At Chicago's O'Hara International Airport, law en-
forcement officers from the local police department, present under
recent FAA directives, 4 have refused to conduct any searches inci-
dent to airport security. 65 Assuming the unavailability of a United
States Marshal, what authority does an airline employee, engaged
in the security program, have to conduct a frisk? The obvious an-
swer is none. He is not a law enforcement officer with any arrest
powers." Since the fourth amendment restricts only governmental
intrusions and not those of private parties without governmental
authority or assistance,67 what would result if an airline employee
were to conduct an unreasonable frisk of a passenger or search of
luggage and discover weapons or contraband? The fruits of such a
search should fit within the scope of the exclusionary rule consider-
ing the federal government's control of commercial aviation through
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the security checks conducted pur-
suant to FAA regulations. 8 When engaged in airport security, air-
line employees are actually acting as agents of the federal govern-
ment. However, the highly questionable decision in United States
v. Burton 9 provides authority contrary to this reasoning. In Burton,
the defendant left a suitcase with an airline ticket agent who ob-
served that he conformed to the hijacker Profile. Upon picking up
the suitcase and noticing an uneven distribution of weight, the
may uncover.
Id. at 1098. This requires two things: 1) reasonableness of the search from its inception and
2) adherence to the scope of the search justified. Problems are presented by the license to
search for explosives. Who may determine where a vial of nitro may be concealed? For an
overview of how the courts have treated this predicament, compare United States v. Slocum,
464 F.2d 1180 (3rd Cir. 1972) [and] United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972) with United States v. Kroll, 351 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo.
1972) landl People v. Erdman, 69 Misc.2d 103, 329 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
64. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
65. Nelson Interview.
66. Callahan Interview.
67. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Watson v. United States, 391 F.2d 927
(5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 985 (1968).
68. For a thorough discussion of these and other points see Note, Airport Security
Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1039, 1041-47 (1971).
69. 341 F. Supp. 302 (W.D.Mo. 1972); accord, Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th
Cir. 1967).
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agent searched the luggage and discovered a weapon. The defendant
was subsequently arrested and his motion to suppress the seized
evidence was later denied. The court stated:
[T]he search of the defendant's suitcase . . .was not so
connected with government participation or influence as to
be characterized as a federal search cast in the form of a
carrier inspection, but rather the search was an indepen-
dent investigation by the carrier for its own purposes. 0
This statement would appear to grant airline employees a wide-
spread and unlimited right to search. Airline employees presently
conducting the security searches have no interest in the prosecution
of passengers who violate FAA regulations. Their primary concern
is solely to confiscate weapons and other dangerous articles that
may be carried aboard commercial aircraft. Therefore, the means of
accomplishing this objective is immaterial to them. Unless the
threat of civil suits for invasion of privacy against airlines and their
employees can curb wholesale violations of the fourth amendment,
the constitutional right to privacy will become meaningless in the
airport terminal. Unrestricted searches by airline personnel would
be disastrous and ultimately transform our airline terminals into
sites of constitutional abuse under a guise of necessity for self-
preservation.
The Physical Search of All Carry-On Baggage
The indiscriminate physical search of all carry-on articles rep-
resents a phase of anti-hijacking efforts that as yet remains untested
by our courts. Advocacy of the constitutionality of the practice must
proceed along very narrow lines to preserve the individual's control
over his personal belongings and perpetuate the esteemed status of
the personal right to privacy. The "powerful hydraulic pressures
throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down
constitutional guarantees"' have been many. It is therefore with
utmost caution that another exception to search and seizure proba-
ble cause and warrant requisites should be created." Despite the
70. Id. at 306.
71. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
72. Inspection searches, conducted for various security and disciplinary reasons, have
been held reasonable without a showing of probable cause and without a warrant. See e.g.,
Walker v. United States, 404 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1968) (border searches); United States
v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652, 654-55 (4th Cir. 1964) (search of enlisted man's on-base home by
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debatable standing of fourth amendment rights in the face of na-
tional security urgencies, wholesale transgression of them must be
subdued.
Authority for the licensing of airline personnel to conduct a
hand search of carry-on baggage may be found in United States v.
Kroll.73 Although the defendant in Kroll was first subjected to a
magnetometer search which proved positive, the ensuing search of
his carry-on baggage was the focus of the court's opinion. The well-
founded rationale of the decision would seem to be equally applica-
ble to baggage searches unrelated to magnetometer use." The court
in Kroll stressed the rule that "[a] generalized need to search will
allow only a general search."75 Hijacking tactics involving the use
of extortion and explosives render the magnetometer ineffective in-
sofar as detection of these hazardous materials is concerned. The
suitability of luggage and other portable receptacles for concealing
such items makes it compulsory for a successful screening procedure
to penetrate their outer shell. This need, supported by the govern-
mental interest in repressing terror in air commerce, is ample justifi-
cation for the hand search." However, 'It]his must not be inter-
preted. . . as a license for the wholesale exploration of a passenger's
luggage and its contents. "" "[A] general search is an inspection of
that which may reasonably be deemed to conceal a weapon or explo-
sives." '' Any further intrusion into one's personal effects would ex-
ceed the type of search warranted by the sole fact that the individ-
ual desires to board the aircraft with carry-on luggage. To progress
military authorities); Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp.
725, 729-31 (M.D.AIa. 1968) (search of student's dorm room); United States v. Donato, 269
F. Supp. 921, 923-24 (E.D.Pa. 1967) (search of government employee's locker).
73. 351 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
74. See note 32 supra. The court in Kroll recognized the indignities that some people
may suffer when a public search of their personal belongings is performed. However, the court
also pointed out that the humiliation suffered by a few is not sufficient to outweigh the
national interest in preventing the potential terror, death and destruction which could occur
without such a search. Accordingly, the court held as a general proposition that
an inspection search of an airline passenger's carry-on luggage for the limited purpose
of protecting lives and property from weapons and explosives is not unreasonable at
its inception.
351 F. Supp. 148, 152 (W.D.Mo. 1972).
75. 351 F. Supp. 148, 153 (W.D.Mo. 1972).
76. "Similar searches are also a matter of routine in every Federal building in the
country open to the public." Id. at 151 n.2.
77. Id. at 152 (original emphasis).
78. Id. at 153 (original emphasis).
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* beyond this limitation, probabilities must exist that approach prob-
able cause standards.
Checked Baggage
Supposedly one may avoid the inconvenience of an inspection
of the contents of his luggage by checking the articles with a ticket
agent for transportation in the baggage compartment of an airliner.
Indeed, signs posted at various positions in Chicago's O'Hare ter-
minal encourage this procedure. 9 What the passengers do not know,
however, is that this does not always exempt these articles from
being searched.80 The screening of checked articles is often per-
formed by X-ray equipment.8 ' This should be the maximum extent
of intrustion condoned. Any physical examination of the contents
of checked articles, without the express consent of the owner, should
be limited to commercial shipments only.8" When luggage is checked
by passengers, their access to its contents is denied, the imminence
of danger by hijacking is greatly diminished and the corresponding
governmental interest is reduced. It is a logical extension of these
facts that a physical search, as opposed to electronic or X-ray sur-
veillance of baggage checked would be unjustified at its inception.8 3
79. Placards posted within the terminal read, "All Hand Articles Will Be Searched
Prior to Boarding - Please - Place These Articles In Checked Luggage to Avoid Delay."
United Air Lines at O'Hare has posters located behind their ticket purchase counters which
read in part:
To Avoid - Having your wrapped packages opened, We Suggest - You place your
wrapped packages in one of our boxes, then they can be checked as luggage and will
be available to claim at your destination.
80. Air carriers are generally given the right to inspect checked items under their own
tariff provisions. Nelson Interview. For example, TWA's tariff reads: "Inspection of Ship-
ments-Shipments are subject to inspection by carriers to determine proper charges there-
on." Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 4 n.3 (9th Cir. 1966).
81. Callahan Interview.
82. In order to stay within the authority granted by a tariff provision, physical searches
must be limited to commercial shipments subject to special freight shipping rates. See note
80 supra. This would exclude passenger's checked luggage since the charges on it are normally
assessed according to weight.
83. To increase security precautions, airlines have formulated directives that prescribe
the refusal of checked baggage unless specific conditions are met. United Air Lines has
supported this policy by directing: 1) no baggage will be accepted from passengers who do
not hold a valid ticket at the time baggage is presented; 2) requests to check baggage for
destinations other than the last destination shown on the passenger's ticket will be denied;
and 3) before baggage belonging to any standby passengers can be checked, it must have
outside identification. United Air Lines Revision to Security Program, §IV, §§B, cls. 1 & 2,
Jan. 4, 1973.
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AN ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARD FOR PROSPECTIVE PASSENGERS
As previously stated, the constitutionality of airport security
procedures depends upon their degree of infringement on personal
rights. Every alternative must be exhausted to perpetuate the
sanctity of civil liberties while implementing a program designed to
deter hijackers. It is therefore appropriate that prospective passen-
gers be informed of their options throughout the procedure and not
be "left in the dark" as to their constitutional freedoms. Perhaps the
most critical phase of security operations occurs immediately prior
to the frisk of persons. Once the magnetometer is activated, the
level of suspicion created does not amount to probable cause neces-
sary for arrest or for issuance of a warrant. 4 After security personnel
have detained the potential passenger, is it reasonable and neces-
sary to proceed with the intrusion and conduct a frisk or extended
search in order to fulfill the governmental interest in deterring hi-
jackings? Does the Government have the right to demand the coop-
eration of the suspect with such investigative measures? Both ques-
tions must be answered in the negative.
The case of United States v. Meulener85 provides the essential
element necessary to afford sufficient protection to the potential
passenger. The defendant in Meulener met the Profile and activated
the magnetometer. The attending United States Marshal ordered
him to open his suitcase, which he did with apparent hesitation, and
marijuana was discovered. The court held:
the defendant's fourth amendment rights were violated
when he was not told at the time the search was initiated
that he had a right to refuse to submit to the search pro-
vided he did not board the airplane. 8
It is evident that the Terry rule should not apply in the situation
where the suspect expresses a desire not to board the flight since the
compelling interest to deter air piracy and achieve safety in air
transportation has already been served. Absent this compelling in-
terest, an intrustion into one's personal privacy is unjustified. 7
84. See United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770-71 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 947 (1972); United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1972); United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1093-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
85. 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D.Cal. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 73-1011, 9th Cir., March
5, 1973.
86. Id. at 1286.
87. Id. at 1289.
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The frisk concept in airport security is based upon the principle
of consent. The lack of any probable cause gives the potential pas-
senger the choice of whether or not he wishes to waive his constitu-
tional rights and subject himself to the pat-down. It has been stated
that
the consent must be proved, by clear and positive evidence,
to be voluntary, unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given rather than resulting from duress or coercion, whether
actual or implied. "8
It is only logical and equitable that a voluntary and intelligent
consent to the airport search be made with knowledge of the right
to make a choice.89
The United States Supreme Court has recently had occasion to
consider the issue of what constitutes a voluntary consent to a pre-
custodial search. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte0 the Court rea-
soned that the individual's knowledge of a constitutional right to
refuse consent is only one factor in the totality of circumstances to
be considered in determining the effectiveness of a consent.9 The
Court also held that to require a law enforcement officer to advise
an individual of a right to refuse consent to a pre-custodial search
would be impractical and a hindrance to investigatory techniques. 2
However, an examination of the majority's opinion reveals that this
rationale has little weight when applied to airport security proce-
dures.
Implicit in the statement that all circumstances surrounding a
consent be examined is the inference that each determination be
made on a case by case basis. The burden of proving a consent to
be voluntary and uncoerced necessarily falls upon the prosecutor;"
the relinquishment of constitutional rights is not an insubstantial
matter capable of being assumed. The Bustamonte decision dis-
counted knowledge of one's right to refuse a search (in a pre-
custodial setting) as solely determinative of a valid consent. This
88. United States v. Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797, 803 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
89. United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 727-28 (2d Cir. 1973); United States
v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 1973) (dictum); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675
(2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J., concurring).
90. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
91. Id. at 227.
92. Id. at 231-32.
93. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
19731
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appears to be an obvious attempt to reduce the burden of proof
required of a prosecutor for practicablity's sake. But the difficulty
in establishing the subjective mental state of a person can readily
be overcome by direct testimony as to the fact that the person was
advised of his constitutional right to refuse consent. What could be
more practical as well as protective of one's right to privacy? When
applied to airport security, the right to be advised acquires added
impetus because of the special nature and purpose of the system;
quite different from the Bustamonte car search performed in the
early morning hours as a result of a traffic violation. Airport security
programs represent another innovative exception to fourth amend-
ment probable cause requirements and careful judicial scrutiny
must be observed to prevent gradual erosion of the amendment's
substantive meaning.
The Court in Bustamonte distinguished the Miranda v.
Arizona 4 requisite of constitutional warnings on grounds that the
latter applied only to custodial searches. 5 However, this distinction
is not present with regard to security searches within the terminal.
Airport security searches conducted subsequent to the initial
screening of persons or luggage are performed by United States
Marshals in a secluded room or area. This, combined with the pres-
ence of armed law enforcement personnel at flight departure points,
creates a very authoritative and coercive atmosphere. Security
searches under such conditions are, in effect, the very kind of cus-
todial searches contemplated in Miranda. These intimidating cir-
cumstances make it impossible for a passenger to give more than a
coerced assent to a frisk or search of luggage without first being
informed of his constitutional prerogative to walk away. An appar-
ent consent could be little more than assent to a claim of lawful
authority regardless of how politely the official phrases a request to
search the person or luggage. Indeed, the Court in Bustamonte left
the door open for such a result when it noted that "evidence of any
inherently coercive tactics-either from the nature of the police
questioning or the environment in which it took place"96 could alter
the result in a different factual setting.
94. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
95. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232 (1973).
96. Id. at 247 (emphasis added). In fact, the Court explicitly declined to determine
"what effect custodial conditions might have on a search authorized solely by an alleged
consent." Id. at 247 n.36 (emphasis added).
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Any theory of implied consent to a security search in the ter-
minal, based upon the presence of signs that warn a passenger that
he is subject to a search, is also constitutionally repugnant. The
right of privacy has been uniformly held to be too significant to be
subject to waiver by silence. 7 Knowledge of available options is an
indispensable factor if consent is to be voluntary and intelligent,
and even then a waiver of constitutional rights must be specific and
explicit. The Government and the airlines' only alternative, when
confronted by a passenger who refuses to submit to a search, is to
deny him passage onto the aircraft." As the court in Meulener
asserted:
The fourth amendment rights of a prospective passenger
who chooses not to board an airliner should be coextensive
with those of anyone else in the terminal. The mere fact of
meeting the profile and activating the magnetometer does
not establish grounds for a forced search."
CONCLUSION
Today, the air transportation industry has attained a vital posi-
tion in the economy of our nation. Airlines are now recognized as a
major mode of travel for millions of Americans. Each airline has
contributed advancements in safety and comfort so that today, the
means for a safe, swift and often relatively inexpensive way of travel
is available to all. Safe, that is, until the hijacker emerged. Now
that a serious threat is directed at the industry and, even more
importantly, at the people who use it, constitutional theorists are
attempting to withdraw the only effective means to alleviate the
problem. These theorists are laboring under an unduly conservative
interpretation of the fourth amendment. The national interest in
abating the hazard of hijackings has transformed the airline ter-
minal into a "critical zone where special fourth amendment consid-
erations apply." 10 The anti-hijacking procedures now in effect have
been developed in light of these special circumstances. Constitu-
tional imperfections do exist in these procedures but their elimina-
97. See United States v. Kroll, 351 F. Supp. 148, 155 (W.D.Mo. 1972); United States
v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
98. See note 21 supra.
99. United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 (C.D.Cal. 1972), appeal dock-
eted, No. 73-1011, 9th Cir., March 5, 1973 (emphasis added). Contra, United States v. Legato,
480 F.2d 408, 411 n.8 (5th Cir. 1973).
100. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1973).
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tion will result in a sensible and reasonable system that can protect
the airline passenger within the terminal as well as in the air.
The establishment of a federal security force would eliminate
one weakness in the airport security arrangements. Hijacking inter-
feres with interstate commerce, can affect national security and
international relations, and is a violation of federal law. A federal
security force would assure uniformity of procedures within a re-
sponsible system and provide the proper personnel to implement
them objectively.'"' Furthermore, to assure the constitutionality of
the security system, the degree to which it encroaches on individual
privacy must be minimized. The compelling national interest to
secure safety in air transportation is not sufficient to warrant unlim-
ited searches that intrude on one's privacy of his person and belong-
ings. Searches within the terminal are justified by their voluntary
nature. Without other suspicions founded upon concrete facts,
United States Marshals must obtain a passenger's consent to search
his person or luggage. Moreover, in the context of an airport setting,
knowledge of one's constitutional rights becomes indispensable. To
insure an informed and uncoerced consent to search, the passenger
must be advised of his option to leave the terminal without boarding
the aircraft and without being searched.
While no security system can prevent the boarding of aircraft
by people such as political terrorists who use extortion and violence
as their ticket, the system we now have is an affective method to
curtail air hijackings. It is the only method that allows latitude for
constitutional rights to be exercised in the face of this national
emergency. The constitutional limitations heretofore prescribed are
designed to strike a balance between the national interest in deter-
ring hijackers and the constitutional requirements of the fourth
amendment. If these limitations are adopted and strictly adhered
to, air travel will once again become a safe means of travel for all.
101. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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